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1. INTRODUCTION
Those of us working at research departments in
central banks are regularly questioned on the right
target for the interest rate in the inter-bank market.
For many of us this is not an easy question, since
the models are not unanimous and the informa-
tion on the true model of the economy is insuffi-
cient. In this note we describe simple guidelines
for interest rate policy compromising on the un-
derlying model as well as on other more practical
issues.
In an environment with multiple distortions
where fiscal and monetary policy are decided opti-
mally, such as Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2002),
the interest rate policy is the Friedman rule, of a
zero nominal interest rate. The distortions that are
taken into account arise from the need to raise rev-
enues with distortionary taxes, the inability of the
government in issuing state-contingent debt, a mo-
nopolistic competitive structure, as well as nomi-
nal rigidities in the form of price setting restric-
tions. The application of optimal principles of tax-
ation implies the Friedman rule. This simple pol-
icy recommendation obtained in a complex envi-
ronment is nevertheless foreign to the policy dis-
cussion where the question is whether to raise or
lower rates around an average rate that is low but
different from zero. In this note we describe an al-
ternative framework where the optimal recom-
mendation is closer to the policy discussion. The
recommendation can also be followed in a simple
fashion with a number of practical shortcuts.
The alternative framework abstracts from im-
portant aspects of the more complete environ-
ment, including the need to raise revenue with
distortionary taxes and the potential distortions re-
sulting from the need to use money for transac-
tions. It is a first best world where all the distor-
tions can be eliminated. Lump sum taxes can be
raised to finance government expenditures. They
also finance a subsidy to production that elimi-
nates the mark up distortion arising from monop-
olistic competition. In order to eliminate the dis-
tortions resulting from sticky prices, it is enough
that the price level be constant over time. In this
case the firms that are restricted not to change
prices will charge the same price as the firms that
are free to set them. Since the price level is con-
stant over time, then the nominal interest rate fluc-
tuates with the real interest rate around a positive
average rate. The distortion caused by a positive
and variable nominal interest rate is eliminated by
assumption as if transactions could be performed
without money.
Since the distortions associated with sticky
prices are eliminated, the real interest rate in the
model with sticky prices coincides with the one
under flexible prices. This is the optimal target for
the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate un-
der flexible prices that moves in response to
shocks, i.e. the natural rate of interest.
There are two main difficulties in conducting
interest rate policy, targeting the natural rate of in-
terest. One is to compute the target, i.e. the real in-
terest rate that would hold under flexible prices in
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / Spring 2005 49
Articles
* The opinions of this paper represent the views of the authors,
and are not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.
** Economic Research Department.
*** Economic Research Department. Universidade Católica
Portuguesa, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and CEPR.response to the shocks that hit the economy. In or-
der to infer the behaviour of the natural rate of in-
terest we look at the behaviour of the real interest
rate on short term bonds in periods where, in the
U.S., inflation was low and stable. The rationale is,
as mentioned above, that in a model with sticky
prices where the price level is constant over time,
the price setting restrictions on firms are not bind-
ing. The equilibrium quantities and prices will be
the same as under flexible prices and, therefore, so
will the real interest rate.
The second difficulty is that it is well known
that interest rate policy is not sufficient to pin
down a single equilibrium. For each interest rate
policy there are multiple equilibria. Even if global
multiplicity cannot in general be excluded it is
possible to use policy to generate local uniqueness.
Under certain conditions, there is therefore a
unique equilibrium close to a particular steady
state. The conditions for local uniqueness are
model dependent but there is a class of models
where a sufficient condition is that the nominal in-
terest rate respond to inflation in a particularly
strong fashion.
In summary, the ingredients to conduct mone-
tary policy in the simplified, and unfortunately
not very satisfactory, framework are the estimation
of the flexible price real interest rate and an active
response to variations in inflation. In the theoreti-
cal model, since the objective is precisely to elimi-
nate the distortions arising from sticky prices, in-
flation will not vary in equilibrium and therefore
all that policy will have to do is to follow the real
rate of interest under flexible prices in its move-
ments in response to shocks. This is the
Wicksellian policy named by Woodford (2003) af-
ter the Swedish economist of the turn of last cen-
tury Knut Wicksell.
The note proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we
describe the behaviour of a measure of the real in-
terest rate on short term bonds in the US for the
post war period. In particular we look at the corre-
lation with the growth rate of output and
detrended output. In periods of low inflation those
correlations are high, so that the inference on the
natural rate of interest will be based on the behav-
iour of those series. In Section 3 we address the is-
sue of local determinacy and therefore the need for
interest rate policy to react to inflation. In Box 1 we
discuss how interest rate policy should be con-
ducted in a model with less instruments and more
distortions, that takes into account the joint deci-
sion of fiscal and monetary policy when taxes are
distortionary.
2. THE NATURAL RATE OF INTEREST
In the theoretical model, the goal of interest
rate policy is to follow the movements of the real
rate of interest under flexible prices, the natural
rate of interest. This unobserved series moves with
shocks that are not observed, according to laws of
behaviour that are also unknown. Without the aid
of complex quantitative tools it would seem im-
possible to find a decision rule on the target for the
nominal rate. However, policy makers seem to be
able to take decisions based on a few indicators of
the state of the economy, such as fluctuations of
GDP around its trend and GDP growth.
In this section we describe the behaviour of a
measure of the real rate of interest for the post war
US economy. We compute this using as the fore-
cast for inflation, the previous four quarters PCE
inflation. We look at the correlations with the
growth rate of GDP, as well as detrended GDP.
We do this for both periods of low and stable in-
flation and periods where it was relatively high
and volatile. We are not surprised to find out that
the correlations are high in the periods where in-
flation was low and stable.
Charts 1 and 2 plot the real interest rate at quar-
terly frequency against, respectively, the annual-
ized GDP growth rate, and deviations of GDP
from trend, for the post war period, 1948-2004, for
the US(1). The shaded bars are the NBER reces-
sions. If we take for instance the 1990-91 recession,
the real interest rate fell down with output from a
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(1) All data are in quarterly frequency. The annualized GDP
growth series was computed as year-on-year rates of change of
real GDP. The GDP deviations from trend series was computed
in reference to a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600. The real interest rate series was computed
as the difference between the nominal yield on secondary mar-
ket three-month Treasury Bill, and the lagged year-on-year rate
of change of the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) de-
flator. The real GDP and the PCE deflator series were extracted
from the NIPA Tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
nominal yield of the three-month Treasury Bill was extracted
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
This series comes in monthly frequency and so was converted
into quarterly frequency through averaging.level of around 4% to a level close to zero after the
trough to go back up with output to a level again
close to 4%, and down again with the 2001 reces-
sion (Chart 2). Other cycles exhibit the same pat-
tern. However, as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2, the
correlation between the real rate of interest and
the measures of economic activity for the whole
period is zero.
Instead, the correlations are positive and high
in periods of low and stable inflation, when we
trust the behaviour of the real rate of interest to be
close to the object of interest, the natural rate of in-
terest. We divide the whole sample, 1948-2004, in a
somewhat arbitrary way as shown in Chart 3. The
shaded areas are the periods considered of low
and stable inflation. In the periods 1953-1973 and
1983-2002 the correlations between the real interest
rate and the measures of economic activity, is high
(around 60%), when we take GDP growth and
somewhat lower for deviations of GDP from trend
(around 50%)(2). The average real rate is 1.2% for
the period 1953-1973 and 2.4% for the second
subperiod of low inflation. For the periods of high
and volatile inflation the averages are -1.7% and
0.6%, respectively, for 1948-1952 and 1974-1982.
The high historical correlation recorded be-
tween the real interest rate and GDP growth in pe-
riods of low and stable inflation justifies an inter-
est rate policy that targets the natural rate of inter-
est by reacting to changes in output growth, rais-
ing the interest rate in phases of accelerating activ-
ity and lowering it otherwise. For the period
1983-2002 the correlation is higher with lagged
output growth, meaning also that the interest rate
is increasing while growth is decreasing before the
peak of the boom. Focusing on Chart 2, it is appar-
ent that in the later period of low and stable infla-
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Sources:Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
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Table 1
CORRELATION BETWEEN GDP GROWTH AND
THE REAL INTEREST RATE
Contemporaneous dy(t),r(t+1) dy(t),r(t+2)
1948-2004 ........ 0.03 0.00 -0.02
1948-1958 ........ -0.34 -0.50 -0.58
1959-1968 ........ 0.61 0.52 0.44
1969-1978 ........ 0.45 0.51 0.48
1979-1988 ........ 0.28 0.22 0.18
1989-1998 ........ 0.32 0.40 0.48
1994-2002 ........ 0.61 0.74 0.84
1953-1973 ........ 0.60 0.57 0.40
1983-2002 ........ 0.61 0.68 0.72
1983-2004 ........ 0.44 0.52 0.56
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
Sources:Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
(2) It is interesting to note that the correlation in the calibrated real
business cycle model of Prescott (1986) is 60%.tion, the typical behaviour of the targeted natural
rate of interest rate along the cycle is to be lowered
with output to the point where it is close to zero,
after the trough of the recession, followed by a rise
to a level of 3 or 4% at the peak of the boom.
In the introduction we mentioned that there
were two difficulties in conducting optimal inter-
est rate policy within our framework. The first
stemmed from the need to find series that can
track the movements of the natural rate of interest.
The GDP growth rate, or detrended output seem
to fare well on that criteria. The second difficulty is
related to finding a policy design that ensures a
unique equilibrium. Since global uniqueness is not
achievable, we will take comfort in local unique-
ness. We now turn to the discussion of this latter
issue and will see that it is in guaranteeing local
uniqueness that there is a role for inflation in the
interest rate feedback rule.
3. TARGETING THE NATURAL RATE OF
INTEREST: LOCAL UNIQUENESS
In the simplified framework all that interest
rate policy has to do in equilibrium is to track the
natural rate of interest. Without knowledge of the
underlying shocks and the true model of the econ-
omy that would reveal the equilibrium rate associ-
ated with a particular history of shocks, the
knowledge of the historic correlations between
output and the real interest rate can be useful. In
the previous section we have documented that in
periods of low and stable inflation, and thus in pe-
riods, where we trust, the real rate of interest was
the natural rate, the one under flexible prices, the
correlation is positive and high.
Tracking the real interest rate in this manner is
a necessary condition to confirm a path of low and
stable inflation which is the optimal equilibrium
path in this set up. It is not sufficient. Every inter-
est rate policy generates multiple paths, possibly
converging to a steady state. When there is a sin-
gle path converging to a steady state, while all the
other equilibrium paths do not, we say that there
is local determinacy. It is little comfort that, within
a multiplicity of equilibrium paths, there may be a
single path converging to a steady state. Still there
is a huge literature on conditions for local determi-
nacy. In a class of models, those conditions are that
the response of the nominal interest rate to infla-
tion be positive and high. Out of equilibrium vari-
ations in inflation require a response in the nomi-
nal interest rate that has to be higher than the vari-
ation itself. The intuition is straightforward. Let us
consider the following linear approximation to the
Fisherian equation in a deterministic model
ir tt t    11 1 
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Table 2
CORRELATION BETWEEN DETRENDED GDP





1948-2004 .... 0.04 0.02 -0.01
1948-1958 .... -0.35 -0.38 -0.34
1959-1968 .... 0.46 0.17 0.00
1969-1978 .... 0.47 0.42 0.26
1979-1988 .... -0.20 -0.26 -0.30
1989-1998 .... 0.54 0.52 0.48
1994-2002 .... 0.52 0.45 0.35
1953-1973 .... 0.46 0.25 0.00
1983-2002 .... 0.40 0.33 0.22
1983-2004 .... 0.33 0.33 0.28
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
Chart 3
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysiswhere it1 is the nominal interest rate between pe-
riod t and t1, rt1 is the real interest rate and
t1 is the inflation rate. If interest rate policy is de-
scribed by the following rule
ir tt t   11 
where 1, then the resulting equilibrium dy-
namic equation is
  tt   1
There are two types of solution of this equation.
Either
t 0,
or t is explosive when it starts from any other
point. In this case the equilibrium with zero infla-
tion is locally determinate. Notice that the policy
rule is such that the interest rate responds to real-
ized inflation rather than a forecast of inflation. If
that was the case the equilibrium equation would
be
  tt   11 ,
so that, for 1, the forecast of inflation would be
pinned down but not current inflation.
When t 0, in equilibrium, policy is con-
ducted so that
ir tt   11 ,
implying that it is necessary to identify the real
rate of equilibrium under flexile prices in order to
be able to target zero inflation. For this reason we
looked at the behaviour of the real interest rate
when the frictions resulting from sticky prices
were made redundant by restricting attention to
periods of low and stable inflation.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In a world with very low and stable inflation,
firms that are restricted in the setting of prices and
unrestricted firms charge the same prices. Sticky
price restrictions are not binding. In that world the
real interest rate is the natural rate of interest, the
one that would hold under flexible prices. In order
to infer the behaviour or the natural rate of interest
we identify time periods for the post-war US econ-
omy where inflation was low and stable and com-
pute the correlation of the nominal interest rate
with measures of economic activity.
We observe that the correlation between the
real interest rate and fluctuations in GDP is high
for periods of low inflation, contrary to the figure
for the whole period, where it is close to zero. If
the task of interest rate policy is to track the natu-
ral rate of interest, thus ensuring a stable price
level, then it is justifiable to follow the principle of
raising the interest rate with output in booms and
lowering it in recessions around a low average
positive rate. The interest rate should also react to
inflation as a means of guaranteeing local unique-
ness of equilibrium.
Unfortunately, in deriving the goal of policy to
be the target of the natural rate of interest we have
abstracted from important issues in what concerns
the underlying framework. In particular we have
ignored the need to raise revenue with
distortionary taxes and the welfare cost of the
money demand distortions. We have also followed
a simplistic approach to the estimation of the natu-
ral rate of interest. Also, local uniqueness of equi-
libria is little comfort when it may be associated
with global indeterminacy (see Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001). Finally, we have
assumed that the nominal rigidity is due to sticky
prices and have not considered the possibility of
other sources of distortions, such as sticky wages
or segmented asset markets.
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Box: OPTIMAL FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY
In this box we describe optimal policy in the environment in Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2004)(1). In this en-
vironment there is underlying uncertainty resulting from shocks to technology and public expenditure. The
agents are households, firms that are monopolistic competitive and set prices in a staggered manner as in Calvo
(1983), and a government. The households have preferences over final consumption goods and leisure. The con-
sumptiongoodsareacompositeofdifferentiatedgoodsproducedbythedifferentfirmswithlabour.Moneyisused
for transactions. The government must finance revenues with distortionary taxes on consumption and labor in-
come as well as a profit tax and is not able to issue state-contingent debt.
Therearemultiplesourcesofdistortionsintheeconomy.Theunavailabilityoflumpsumtaxesmakesitneces-
sary for the government to raise revenue with consumption and labour income taxes creating wedges in the mar-
ginal choice between consumption and leisure. Since the firms are monopolistic competitive, prices are set with a
mark up over marginal cost which is also a source of inefficiency. The fact that firms face different restrictions on
the timing of price changes may create a relative price distortion since firms that are otherwise identical may
charge different prices. This is a productive inefficiency since production would take place inside the production
possibilities frontier. A positive nominal interest rate distorts the demand for money inducing agents to spend
productive resources on transactions. Finally, the inability of the government to issue state-contingent debt may
alsoaddtothewelfarecostofdistortionarytaxation,sinceitmaylimitthecapacityofthegovernmenttodealwith
uncertainty in expenditure and revenue.
In this complex environment where there is a trade-off between different distortions, it is feasible and optimal
to eliminate every distortion except for the necessary wedges in the decision of consumption and leisure arising
from the absence of lump sum taxes. The mark up distortion is eliminated with the revenue from the profit tax.
The money demand distortion is eliminated with the Friedman rule. The distortions associated with price sticki-
ness are dealt with a policy that promotes the stability of the price level net of consumption taxes (producer price
level). The elimination of these distortions is consistent with the policy aim of achieving productive efficiency ac-
cording to the principle in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) that even in a second best environment productive effi-
ciencyisoptimal.ThisiscompatiblewiththeFriedmanrulesincetheoptimaluseofconsumptiontaxesallowsthe
pricelevelgrossofconsumptiontaxes (consumerpricelevel)tochangeaccordingtofluctuationsintherealinter-
est rate. Consumption taxes also allow to replicate real state-contingent debt with ex-post volatility of the price
level gross of consumption taxes.
Moreprecisely,therationalefortheoptimalityoftheFriedmanruleisthefollowing:Thenominalinterestrate
is the price charged on the use of money. In case it is higher than the production cost of money then it includes a
tax on money. The usual assumption on the production cost is that it is negligible, so that whenever the nominal
interest rate is positive we say that money is being taxed. There are two good reasons to set the nominal interest
rateequaltozero.Whilefinalgoodsingeneralshouldbetaxedthatisnotthecasewithintermediategoods.Taxa-
tionofintermediategoodscreatesinefficienciesinproductionthatshouldbeavoided.Moneyisobviouslynotafi-
nal good but, rather, an intermediate good that is useful to perform transactions. For this reason money should
notbetaxed.Butthereisanevenstrongerreasontochargeaverylowpriceonmoney.Moneyisagoodthathasa
very low cost of production. The cost in producing coins or bank notes is not zero but it is very low. Even if the
proportionate tax on money was positive and very high, when applied to a very low cost of production, the result-
ing price charged for the use of money would also be very low(2). This is the second reason not to tax money.
Thepolicyofazeronominalinterestrateisconsistentwiththeprinciplesofoptimaltaxationfromanotheran-
gle.Inparticular,itisconsistentwithnopricedispersionacrossfirmsthatonlydifferonthepricesettingrestric-
(1) See also Siu (2004), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Benigno and Woodford (2003), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) and Lucas and Sto-
key (1983).
(2) Sincethenominalinterestrate(it)isthepriceofmoney,itcanbewrittenasafunctionoftheproductioncostofmoney()andtheproportionate
tax rate on money ( t
m) as: 	
 itt
m   1 . For  arbitrarily close to zero, a positiveitentails an arbitrarily large  t
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tions. For this it is necessary that the producer price level be stable. If the price level is stable, then firms that are
not able to set prices will charge the same price as the unrestricted firms. A stable producer price level is optimal
according, again, to the principle that, even in a second best world, it is not desirable to create distortions in pro-
duction.
Whenthenominalinterestrateiszero,sincetherealinterestratefluctuatesaroundapositiveaverage,andbe-
cause the nominal interest rate is roughly equal to the real rate plus expected inflation (gross of taxes), it must be
the case that expected inflation is different from zero and fluctuates with the shocks. With consumption taxes the
movements in the inflation rate can be captured by policy movements in those taxes still keeping the producer
price level constant.